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INTRODUCTION 
The protection of the Community's financial interests and the fight against fraud are 
areas of shared responsibility between the Community and the Member States. Each 
year the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, produces a report 
presenting the new measures they have taken to meet their obligations in this field, in 
accordance with Article 280 of the EC Treaty. The report is addressed to Parliament 
and the Council and is published. 
The Commission and the Member States jointly decided that, as well as giving a 
general overview of the measures taken in various areas, the report should deal with 
four specific issues: risk analysis and risk management; debarment databases and 
warning systems involving internal informants and mechanisms for recovery by 
offsetting. 
The  first part of the report gives a summary of the statistics concerning 
irregularities reported by the Member States in accordance with sectoral regulations 
and provides some figures relating to the operational activities of the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF). 
The  second part concerns the measures taken by the Member States and the 
Commission to prevent fraud and to deal with other irregularities. It also examines 
the topic of risk analysis and risk management and debarment databases and 
warning systems.  
The third part gives an account of the anti-fraud measures taken. It also contains a 
section on warning systems involving internal informers. 
The  fourth part presents the steps taken to improve recovery of amounts not 
collected or wrongly paid. It contains a section on mechanisms for recovery by 
offsetting under national law. 
The report provides only a summary of the measures taken and the results obtained. 
Alongside it, the Commission publishes two working papers, one detailing the 
Member States' contributions
1 and the other containing statistics on the irregularities 
reported by the Member States
2. 
Previous years' reports are available on OLAF's website
3.  
                                                 
1  "Implementation of Article 280 of the Treaty by the Member States in 2006", SEC(2007) 930. 
2  "Statistical Evaluation of Irregularities", SEC(2007) 938. 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/reports/anti-fraud_en.html.  
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1.  RESULTS OF THE FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD: STATISTICS ON FRAUD AND OTHER 
IRREGULARITIES 
1.1.  Statistics on fraud and other irregularities reported by the Member States 
in 2006 
The protection of financial interests is an area of shared responsibility. In the fields 
where the Member States implement the budget (agricultural policy, Structural Funds 
and pre-accession funds) and for the collection of the Community's own resources, 
Community legislation requires the Member States to report suspicions of fraud and 
other irregularities affecting Community financial interests. Expenditure managed by 
the Member States accounts for some 80% of the Community budget. 
The Commission's working paper on "Statistical evaluation of irregularities", 
published at the same time as this report, presents an in-depth analysis of the 
statistics derived from the information received. Though this report does not include 
statistics on irregularities detected in connection with expenditure directly managed 
by the Communities, the Commission has taken steps to ensure that they are 
provided in future. 
Table 1 shows the number of irregularities reported and the amounts involved for 
each area. 
Table 1 – Number of irregularities and amounts – 2006 
TOTAL 2006 
Area  Number of 
irregularities 
reported 
Total estimated 
financial 
impact of 
irregularities, 
including 
suspected 
fraud 
(€million) 
Estimated financial 
impact of suspected 
fraud (€million) 
Own resources  5 243  353  134.39 (~0.94% of the 
total amount of own 
resources in 2006
4) 
 
EAGGF 
Guarantee 
Section 
3 249  87  29.8 (~0.06% of the 
total allocations) 
Structural Funds 
and Cohesion 
Fund 
3 216  703  157.56 (~0.41% of 
total allocations) 
                                                 
4  This percentage is calculated on the basis of an estimate of traditional own resources in the 2006 
general budget, and not on the basis of accounts.   
EN  6     EN 
Pre-accession 
funds 
384  12.32  1.57 (~0.03% of total 
allocations) 
5 
 
Total  12 092  1 155.32 
323.32(~0.94% of own 
resources and ~0.2% of 
the total expenditure in 
the three areas
6) 
1.1.1.  Traditional own resources 
In 2006, the number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported (exceeding €10 000) 
was down 12% on 2005 (from 5  943 to 5  243), but the amount affected by 
irregularities rose by over 7% (from €328 million to €353 million
7). Suspected fraud 
accounts for approximately 22% of the cases of irregularities reported, with an 
estimated financial impact of €134.39 million, equivalent to approximately 0.94% of 
the total amount of own resources in 2006. This compares with €105.3  million 
(around 0.85% of own resources) in 2005. Graph 1 shows the trends in the number of 
irregularities reported over the last five years and their estimated financial impact. 
The increase in the total number of cases since 2003 can be accounted for by an 
increase in the number of cases reported by the Member States, the inclusion of 
transit operations discharged late and the accession of new Member States. The 
number and proportion of transit operations cleared late has fallen compared with 
2005 (by over a third)
8. 
The goods most affected by irregularities in 2006, as in previous years, are tobacco 
products and TVs. The figures for sugar, fish, glass and glassware and optical 
instruments were down on 2005, whereas meat, engines and parts, inorganic products 
and oils and fats were all up. The textile sector remained relatively stable, involving 
€10.3 million in duties. 
                                                 
5  Percentage of suspected fraud during 2000-06 period for all funds allocated during the period. 
6  The pro rata for 2000-06 has been taken into account for the pre-accession fund. 
7  The figures published in the 2005 report have been updated. 
8  In 2005, 2 313 transit operations were cleared late, compared with 1 381 in 2006.  
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Graph 1: Number of irregularities reported and estimated financial impact in the 
area of traditional own resources – 2002-06 (€million) 
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1.1.2.  Agricultural expenditure (EAGGF Guarantee Section) 
In 2006 the number of irregularities reported was up 3% on the previous year (3 249 
cases in 2006). The total amount involved in 2006 was 15% down, at €87 million, 
accounting for almost 0.17% of total appropriations for the EAGGF Guarantee 
Section (€49 742 million for 2006). Suspected fraud accounted for around 10% of all 
irregularities reported (€29.8 million, 0.06% of total appropriations, compared with 
€21.5 million, or 0.05% of total appropriations in 2005). 
The highest number of irregularities reported related to rural development, bovine 
sector, and fruit and vegetables. Together these three groups accounted for almost 
60% of the total number of reported irregularities and almost 70% of the total 
amount affected by irregularities. 
A Regulation adopted by the Commission in 2006
9 simplifies the procedures for 
reporting irregularities in the area of agricultural expenditure from 2007. The 
threshold above which Member States are required to report irregularities to the 
Commission has now been brought into line with the threshold for the Structural 
Funds (€10 000). 
                                                 
9  Precise references to the Regulations mentioned in this chapter are given in the Commission's working 
paper "Statistical evaluation of irregularities", referred to above.  
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Graph 2: Number of irregularities reported and estimated financial impact in the 
area of agricultural expenditure - years 2000-06 (€million) 
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1.1.3.  Structural measures 
The European Parliament and the Council adopted a series of Regulations for the 
Structural Funds, for the new 2007-13 programming period. The rules on reporting 
irregularities to the Commission have been retained. The old Regulations continue to 
apply for former programming periods. 
In 2006 the number of irregularities reported (3 216 cases, including the Cohesion 
Fund) was down 10% on the previous year (3 750 cases) whereas their financial 
impact increased by 17% to €703 million in 2006. The estimated financial impact of 
the irregularities reported in 2006 accounts for around 1.83% of the Structural and 
Cohesion Fund appropriations (€38 430 million) for 2006, and suspected fraud for 
approximately 16.6% of irregularities reported (€157.56 million, around 0.41% of 
total appropriations, against €205 million, or 0.53% of total appropriations for 2005). 
The final impact will not be known until the programmes have been wound up. 
As in previous years, the ERDF and ESF account for the most irregularities (around 
75%). The number of irregularities reported for the Guidance Section of the EAGGF 
increased by 38%; for the Cohesion Fund and the FIFG it remained stable. 
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Graph 3: Number of irregularities reported and estimated financial impact for 
structural measures 2002-06 (€million) 
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1.1.4.  Pre-accession funds 
The number of irregularities concerning PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA funds for 2006 
increased by 13.6% (384, compared with 338 in 2005). The presumed financial 
impact of the irregularities increased for PHARE and SAPARD but fell for ISPA 
(from €6.9 million in 2005 to €1.2 million in 2006). For 2006, the total amount of 
irregularities reported was down 26% to €12.318  million (from €16.7 million in 
2005), approximately 2.8% of the total eligible amounts for the three funds. 
Suspected fraud accounted for approximately 14.63% of the irregular amounts 
reported. The financial impact is estimated at €1.57 million. The financial impact of 
reported fraud for 2000-06 amounts to 0.03% of total allocations to the three funds in 
that period. 
The most frequently reported type of irregularity for each of the pre-accession funds 
was “non-eligible expenditure”
10. For the PHARE fund, the second most common 
irregularity was “unjustified expenditure”
11. 
                                                 
10  Expenditure is "ineligible" when the commitment criteria laid down by the Member States are not met 
or it is not paid in accordance with the relevant Community and national rules. 
11  Expenditure is "unjustified" when it is eligible but there are no supporting documents or when the 
money is used for purposes other than those for which it was granted.   
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Graph 4: Number of irregularities reported and estimated financial impact for the 
accession funds – 2002-06 (€million) 
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1.2.  Statistics on OLAF's activities 
The number of investigations opened by OLAF following evaluation of information 
received fell (195 in 2006 against 214 in 2005). The decision to open a case is based 
on a preliminary assessment. 
Graph 5: Cases opened following evaluation of information received 
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At 31 December 2006 there were a total of 430 investigations in progress, which is 
comparable with the 2005 figure (452 at 31 December 2005).  
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Table 2 : Cases ongoing at 31 December 2006 by sector, and their financial impact 
Sector  Cases pending at 31 
December 2006 
Estimated financial 
impact (€million) 
Agriculture  65  202.7 
Structural Funds  46  192.9 
Customs  111  748.9 
Direct Expenditure  118  293.4 
Internal Investigations  91  301 
Total 431  1 738.8 
For more details concerning OLAF investigations and comparison with previous 
years, see the OLAF Report
12. 
2.  FRAUD PREVENTION 
2.1.  Risk analysis and management, control systems 
As part of a sound control system, appropriate assessment and management of risk 
help ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent properly when implementing policies. 
This area is currently being developed within the Commission as well as in Member 
States, to ensure proactive protection of financial interests, prevention and targeted 
action. 
2.1.1.  Measures relating to expenditure 
For some years the Commission has used risk management not just in relation to 
expenditure but more generally too. Acknowledging the need for a common 
approach to risk management
13, the Commission has taken a number of steps since 
2006
14. The objective is to improve the decision-making process, to increase 
effectiveness and to strengthen the reliability of management systems. In this 
context, Commission departments now have a common methodology for analysing 
risk and choosing the right response. In the latter part of 2006, a pilot study was 
carried out to test a structure meant to improve risk management for several 
departments and bring about more effective management by grouping services. That 
structure is to be put on a permanent footing in 2007. 
                                                 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/anti_fraud/reports/index_en.html. 
13  Communication concerning a roadmap for a framework of integrated internal control, COM(2005) 252. 
14  Communication to the Commission from Ms Grybauskaité in agreement with the President and Vice-
president Kallas, "Towards an effective and coherent risk management in the Commission services", 
SEC(2005) 1327.  
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At national level all Member States have rules in their budgetary procedures to help 
managers to assess and manage the financial risks involved in awarding grants and 
public contracts, in particular to verify the reliability of potential beneficiaries
15. 
The new financial rules introduced in 2006
16 require to national administrations 
establish effective internal control systems and perform the necessary inspections on 
the EU funds they manage. This means providing information and reporting each 
year on controls and audits. 
Approximately half of the Member States have general national guidelines 
(instructions or good practices)
17 or rules on risk assessment and management in 
specific fields
18. 
Nine Member States have special tools for assessing the risk posed by new recipients 
of public funds. For example, in Ireland additional information not yet available on 
new applicants may be sought at the grant assessment stage. In Poland first-time 
CAP beneficiaries are more likely to be referred for on-site inspection. 
When a beneficiary is identified as posing a risk, this may result in tighter checks by 
the managing authority
19 or in a systematic requirement for special guarantees
20. 
When a (national or Community) grant or public contract is awarded, applicants are 
required by managing authorities to submit relevant documents declaring that they 
fulfil the criteria. In some Member States the managing authorities have access to 
specific databases to check the accuracy of the declarations by applicants; these 
include databases on tax (accessible in more than half of the Member States
21), on 
financial institutions
22 and on persons and corporate bodies ordered to pay penalties 
in either administrative
23 or criminal proceedings
24. In Hungary, a 2006 law 
establishes a new creditor protection register to provide full and up-to-date 
information on creditworthiness and measures to be taken by the courts against 
registered companies. 
                                                 
15  These rules were established some years ago but have been evolving. Thus, for example, the Spanish 
authorities reported that a 2006 law on subsidies enabled a criminal penalty to be imposed for failure to 
lodge a guarantee when required to do so.  
16  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 making the financial regulation 
applicable to the general budget of European Communities, OJ L248/1, 16.9.2002, lastly modified by 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1995/2006 of 13 December 2006, OJ L 390, 30.12.2006. 
17  The Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Finland and the United Kingdom. 
18  Public procurement: Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. Grants and subsidies 
(including Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund, pre-accession and Transition Facility programmes): 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia. Agriculture: Ireland, 
France and Luxembourg. 
19  Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
20  Germany and France. Under Maltese law, the authorities may require a guarantee from a person whose 
VAT registration may give rise to a particular risk. 
21  The Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, 
Poland, Finland and Sweden. In Portugal the law on the 2006 budget provides for publication of the 
main tax debtors. 
22  Denmark, Greece (indirect), France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Finland and the United Kingdom. 
23  Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Austria, Poland, Portugal and Finland. 
24  The Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Poland, 
Portugal and Finland.  
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2.1.2.  Customs 
The national customs authorities have for a long time been using risk analysis to 
identify potential illegal activities and to target controls more effectively. Over the 
years coordination at European level has improved the effectiveness of actions taken 
by the national authorities. 
In 1997 the Commission presented an action plan for transit in Europe
25 to combat 
transit fraud more effectively and in 2001 it drew up a revised regulatory framework 
which included the introduction of a new computerised transit system (NCTS). 
Following the special report of the Court of Auditors No 11/2006, the Commission 
took the necessary measures to ensure that, from 2007 onwards, it could access 
NCTS data concerning sensitive goods for the purposes of risk analysis, so that it 
could promote strategies for targeted physical controls of goods in transit. 
The Commission also continued to improve the ConTraffic system, which provides 
an overview of container traffic. The system enables a container's itinerary to be 
monitored so that suspicious consignments can be identified. With a new web 
interface launched in 2006 and a database with over 220 million entries relating to 
more than 4.4 million containers, the system has been used by national authorities to 
help them combat fraud more effectively, particularly through joint customs 
operations carried out in 2006. 
In December 2006 the Commission adopted a Regulation
26 amending some of the 
implementing provisions of the Community Customs Code. The Regulation also 
provides for the application of common risk criteria and common priority control 
areas and sets out standards for the harmonised application of customs controls in 
specific cases. 
2.2.  Debarment, early-warning and reliability databases 
2.2.1.  At EU level 
In 2006 the Commission reviewed the European early-warning and debarment 
systems
27 with a view to improving the management of certain risks associated, in 
particular, with public procurement systems and the protection of the Communities’ 
financial interests. In this framework, OLAF and Transparency International (TI) 
organised a round table in January 2006 on ways to protect the EU's financial 
interests with debarment systems
28. 
                                                 
25  COM(97) 188 final, OJ C 176, 10.06.1997. 
26  Commission Regulation (EC) No 1875/2006 of 18 December 2006 amending Regulation (EEC) 
No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 
establishing the Community Customs Code (OJ L 360, 19.12.2006). 
27  The debarment systems are administrative sanction systems whereby economic operators who find 
themselves in one of the situations covered by the exclusion criteria are debarred from certain 
procedures or advantages, such as participation in a public tender or subsidies. The debarred operators 
are listed in a database accessible to the competent authorities. 
28  Following the meeting, TI drew up a number of recommendations for improving the debarment systems 
within the Commission and on the introduction of a centrally managed European debarment system 
covering all Community expenditure, including funds under shared management.  
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Article 95 of the Financial Regulation, as amended in 2006, provides for the 
introduction of a central database of organisations excluded from contracts and 
grants financed by the EU budget. It is a common database of the institutions, 
executive agencies and bodies covered by Article 185 of the Financial Regulation. 
This database will contain all relevant information on entities convicted of fraud or 
corruption in the Member States and in third countries involved in the 
implementation of EU programmes. The system will be supplied with information 
from partners authorities involved in implementing the Community budget in the 
Member States will also be able to consult it
29. 
The Commission already has an internal Early Warning System (EWS) database 
containing information on funds managed directly by the Commission, in compliance 
with the rules on personal data protection. 
The Commission also manages a database for risk identification in relation to 
economic operators in the specific field of the EAGGF Guarantee Section. 
Information for this database is supplied by the Member States. In the second report 
on the application of the Regulation setting up this system
30, the Commission refers 
to problems with application, such as the limited number of irregularities reported, 
problems with the interpretation of legal concepts, or Member States' fear of having 
legal proceedings brought against them in the national courts by operators entered in 
the database. 
As well as the debarment databases, there are also databases on reliable beneficiaries, 
which help to improve risk assessment. The Regulation amending the provisions 
implementing the Community Customs Code
31 provides for the status of approved 
economic operator to be granted to reliable operators who meet certain criteria. 
These approved operators then benefit from simplifications under customs legislation 
and/or customs control facilities. 
2.2.2.  In the Member States 
The two Directives on public procurement adopted in 2004
32 require that Member 
States debar any economic operator who has been found guilty of participating in a 
criminal organisation, of corruption, of fraud detrimental to the financial interests of 
the European Community or of money laundering, once a definitive court judgement 
has been handed down. The Directives also provide for the possibility of excluding 
an economic operator who is bankrupt or being wound up, who has suspended 
trading, whose affairs are being administered by the court, who has been convicted of 
a criminal offence affecting his professional standing, committed serious 
professional misconduct or not paid social security contributions or taxes. 
                                                 
29  This database will be created at the latest by 1 January 2009. 
30  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of the 
Regulation (EC) No 1469/95 (« blacklist »), COM(2005) 520; SEC(2005) 1333 of 20.10.2005. 
31  See footnote 26. 
32  Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts and Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
31  March  2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors, OJ L 134, 30.4.2004.  
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In connection with the recent developments in the field of early-warning and 
debarment (blacklisting) systems, Member States were asked to indicate what 
databases of risky beneficiaries they had (if any) and to describe one in greater detail. 
It must be stressed that the fact that half of Member States
33 do not have this kind of 
database does not mean that they do not have measures or rules in place to identify 
risky beneficiaries (see point 2.1.1.). 
Almost all the databases described aim at prevention (early-warning system)
34. Entry 
in the database leads, for example, to special guarantees being required or tighter 
controls. Seven of these databases
35 are also (or purely) punitive, i.e. entry in the 
database entails or may entail penalties such as exclusion from public procurement or 
public grants for a limited period. 
All the databases include information on the legal person responsible for the 
irregularity in question, and most of them also on the natural persons involved (such 
as the person who committed the irregularity or the manager of the firm)
36. Six 
databases also contain information on legal persons linked to the legal person 
responsible for the irregularity (holding company, subsidiary, etc.)
37. 
In all the countries with tax databases
38 , not being up to date with taxes or social 
security contributions is considered a ground for inclusion in the database. Some 
databases also register beneficiaries who are in debt
39, those against whom 
administrative penalty proceedings have been brought
40 or who have been ordered to 
pay an administrative penalty
41, those prosecuted for alleged financial offences
42 or 
convicted of a financial offence (at first or final instance)
43. In most cases the tax 
authority decides on inclusion of beneficiaries in or removal from the database
44. 
Regarding databases in the area of public procurement
45, in Austria beneficiaries are 
entered in the database if they are ordered to pay an administrative penalty.  In 
Germany beneficiaries are entered in the corruption register if they are ordered to pay 
an administrative penalty or are convicted of financial offences at final instance. The 
most extensive database seems to be the public works database in Italy, for which all 
of the situations referred to above are grounds for inclusion. Beneficiaries are also 
included in the database if they have failed to comply with the obligations attaching 
to the award of a grant or a public contract. 
                                                 
33  Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Hungary, France, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom. 
34  Denmark, Slovenia and Slovakia (tax databases). Germany, Italy and Austria (public procurement 
databases). Lithuania and Poland (Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund). 
35  Germany, Italy, Austria, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden. 
36  Except for Poland. 
37  Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Austria, Slovakia and Sweden. 
38  Denmark, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. 
39  Slovakia and Sweden. 
40  Slovenia and Slovakia. 
41  Denmark, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
42  Slovenia and Slovakia. 
43 Denmark  and  Slovakia. 
44  Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden. In Slovakia inclusion or removal is automatic. 
45  Germany (Berlin), Italy and Austria.  
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The main ground for entering a beneficiary in the databases relating to subsidies
46 is 
failure to comply with the obligations attaching to the award
47. Possible grounds 
include ongoing prosecution for alleged financial offences
48 or final conviction of 
financial offences
49. 
Amongst the main grounds for removing a beneficiary from the database are that a 
given time period has elapsed
50, that the initial situation has changed
51 or that 
exploratory proceedings have proved that no irregularity has occurred
52. In two 
instances removal from the database is not possible
53. 
Concerning the right of defence, in six Member States beneficiaries are informed 
when they are entered in the database
54. Sometimes they can appeal against the 
decision to enter them
55. Such appeal proceedings can be either administrative
56 or 
judicial
57. 
Most of the databases are centralised
58, others are managed locally. Four databases 
are accessible to authorities other than the one which manages them
59. In three 
Member States the database is also accessible to the authorities of other Member 
States, non-EU countries or international organisations which abide by equivalent 
data protection rules and apply for access to it
60. With the exception of Sweden, the 
databases are not accessible to the public. 
More than half of Member States
61 indicated that they have to comply with rules on 
personal data protection in addition to the Community regulations on the matter 
(e.g. Constitutional guarantees). 
Member States mentioned several problems with establishing or operating the 
databases, e.g. inappropriate legal basis
62, the need to demonstrate a specific legal 
purpose to justify the existence of a database
63, doubts about which data relating to 
legal and natural persons could be published in the system
64, technical problems with 
linking the database to other databases
65, problems with identification of companies 
                                                 
46  Structural and Cohesion Funds: Lithuania, Malta and Poland. Agriculture: Latvia. 
47  Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. 
48 Poland. 
49 Latvia. 
50  Denmark, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and Sweden. 
51  Germany. Article 8(2) of the Corruption Register Act. 
52 Poland. 
53 Latvia  and  Lithuania. 
54  Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden. 
55  Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia and Sweden. 
56  Denmark, Italy and Latvia. 
57 Germany  and  Sweden. 
58  Denmark, Germany (centralised at Land level), Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and 
Sweden. 
59  Germany, Malta, Austria and Sweden. 
60  Denmark (in exceptional cases), Italy and Sweden. 
61  Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Sweden. 
62 Slovakia. 
63 Austria. 
64 Lithuania. 
65 Malta.  
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if they change legal form
66 and seeking out all the available information to deal with 
the complexity of risk assessment
67. The problems cited are similar to the ones 
described in the Commission's second report on implementation of the Regulation 
establishing a system for identifying operators presenting a risk in connection with 
the EAGGF Guarantee Section
68. 
There are also measures (instruments) for reliable beneficiaries, such as a specific 
database on reliable beneficiaries (“whitelist”), certification scheme or qualitative 
evaluation of results. 
In Germany (Berlin), firms which have proved their technical capacity, efficiency 
and reliability may apply to be entered in a register of construction contractors and 
construction suppliers. Firms that have committed offences are removed from the 
register for a limited period and can be disqualified from being awarded public 
contracts. 
In Italy any firm performing public works contracts worth more than €150 000 must 
hold a certificate. Qualified firms are entered in a computerised register at the 
Observatory for Public Works. A certificate (clearance) is also issued under anti-
Mafia legislation. 
Though it is not possible to discern a dominant model in the Member States amongst 
the range of databases described above, the examples show what is possible in this 
field. This overview also allows the Commission to consider whether the European 
early-warning and blacklisting policy needs improving and to look at ways of 
making the rules and procedures clearer and more transparent. 
2.3.  More transparent EU decision-making in financial management at EU level 
Following the European Transparency Initiative
69, the new Article 30(3) of the 
Financial Regulation provides for transparency concerning the beneficiaries of funds 
deriving from the Community budget, irrespective of how those funds are managed. 
An annual retrospective publication will be produced on beneficiaries of the 
Structural Funds starting in 2008. This applies also for the common agricultural 
policy, for the expenditures of the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) 
from the financial year 2008, and for those of the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD) from the 1
st January 2007. Some Member States
70 
applied this principle of transparency even before the reform of the Financial 
Regulation. The Commission hosts a central web portal with links to the relevant 
                                                 
66 Austria. 
67 Slovakia. 
68  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Regulation (EC) No 1469/95 ("blacklist"), COM(2005) 520; SEC(2005) 1333 of 20.10.2005. 
69 COM(2006)  194  final. 
70  For example, in 2006 information on the beneficiaries of the common agricultural policy was made 
available to the public in Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.  
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websites in Member States
71. The Commission itself already publishes information 
on the beneficiaries of programmes which it manages directly
72. 
Providing the public with access to this financial information enables them to exert 
indirect control on the way in which the European funds are spent which helps 
ensure a better protection of the Communities’ financial interests. 
2.4.  Improving accounting and control rules for a positive statement of assurance 
In January 2006, the Commission adopted an action plan for an integrated internal 
control framework
73 taking account of the European Court of Auditors' opinion 
No 2/2004
74. This action plan is a contribution to the Barroso Commission's 
objective of achieving a positive statement of assurance by the Parliament on budget 
implementation. 
Within this framework, the Commission's 2005 Report on the protection of the 
financial interests of the Communities and the fight against fraud
75 brought together 
some information on systems for certifying proper implementation of public 
expenditure in the Member States. 
A number of the more significant developments that occurred in 2006 are described 
below
76. 
The new Council Regulation on the Structural Funds adopted in July 2006 for the 
period 2007-2013, as well as the Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005
77 on the 
financing of the CAP, introduces several improvements to simplify and clarify the 
rules, which should provide the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the 
Parliament with better guarantees that the money has been well spent. An evaluation 
of the Member States' control components, as well as indicators of legality and 
irregularity, have been set up. 
The monitoring of payment bodies has been strengthened where management is 
shared, and provision has been made for a regular revision mechanism with regard to 
agriculture and the Structural Funds. 
The Welsh and Austrian authorities signed a "contract of confidence" with the 
Commission in 2006. This is a voluntary arrangement between the Commission and 
the authorities of a Member State to guarantee the quality of audit work on current 
                                                 
71 http://ec.europa.eu/grants/beneficiaries_en.htm. 
72 http://ec.europa.eu/public_contracts/beneficiaries_en.htm.   
73  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Court of 
Auditors: Commission Action Plan towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework, COM(2006) 9 
and SEC(2006) 49. The framework of integrated control means monitoring systems and complementary 
control that are sufficient to give a reasonable assurance that the risk of error is properly managed at all 
operational levels. 
74  Opinion No 2/2004 of the Court of Auditors of the European Communities on the “single audit” model 
(OJ C 107, 30.4.2004). 
75 COM(2006)  378  final. 
76  See also the first report on the progress of the Action Plan, COM(2007) 86 final. 
77  Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005 of 21 June 2005 on the financing of the common agricultural 
policy (OJ L 209, 11.8.2005).  
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programmes under the Structural Funds until 2008. The conclusion of such a contract 
indicates that the Commission has obtained assurances regarding the proper 
functioning of the management and control system, the audit strategy and the quality 
of the annual audit report. Negotiations on "contracts of confidence" with other 
Member States are well advanced. 
In 2006, the Netherlands adopted an initiative for the provision of a national 
declaration of assurance at political level on Community funds in line with the 
European Parliament and Commission proposals. The Commission thinks that this 
initiative could pave the way for other similar initiatives. 
2.5.  Hercule action programme to promote activities in the field of the protection of 
the Community's financial interests 
The programme is intended to help to promote activities relating to the protection of 
the Community's financial interests
78. In June the Commission proposed amending 
the Hercule programme and extending it to the end of 2013
79. 
In 2006, the programme awarded cofinancing grants to eleven training projects, five 
seminars, one study on comparative law and 23 technical-assistance projects. 
The Commission proposed increasing the programme's financial allocation by 
€44 million for the period 2007-13 (€6 million for 2007), in particular to finance 
training measures and equipment purchases to combat cigarette smuggling under the 
cooperation agreement signed with the cigarette manufacturer, Philip Morris 
International. 
3.  COMBATING FRAUD 
3.1.  Detection of fraud: warning systems involving internal informants 
(whistleblowing) 
Civil servants and other staff of administrative authorities are the best placed to 
realise what the risks are and thus to prevent and combat fraud. The treatment of 
whistleblowers has changed considerably in recent years in some Member States, as 
it has in the European Union and various international organisations. 
3.1.1.  European institutions 
In 1999, the European institutions introduced rules requiring any official or other 
staff member who suspects serious wrong-doing to inform their head of department 
or Director-General or, if appropriate, to go direct to the Secretary-General of the 
Commission or to OLAF
80. 
                                                 
78 http://ec.europa/anti-fraud/programmes/index_en.html. 
79  COM(2006) 339. At the time of writing, this proposal had not yet been adopted by the Council and the 
Parliament. 
80  Article 2 of the inter-institutional agreement of 25 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the Commission concerning internal investigations by OLAF 
(OJ L 149, 16.6.1999).  
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In 2004, a new article was added to the Staff Regulations of officials of the European 
Communities and Conditions of Employment of other servants of the European 
Communities. Article 22a of the Staff Regulations incorporates the obligation laid 
down in the 1999 decision
81. 
The Staff Regulations also provide for the protection of whistleblowers, providing 
that: "an official shall not suffer any prejudicial effects […] as a result of having 
communicated the information [...] provided that he acted reasonably and honestly." 
Amongst its measures relating to good conduct on the part of officials and other 
servants of the European Communities, the Commission provided its staff with 
training on how to pass on information about any potential fraud or other 
irregularities which they may detect. 
In 2006, no OLAF investigations were launched as the result of information received 
direct from a whistleblower. 
3.1.2.  Member States 
In their contributions to this report, all Member States indicated that they had 
adopted legal provisions or practices entitling or requiring civil servants and other 
public administration employees to pass on information discovered in the course of 
their duties if they suspect that an irregularity, fraud, corruption or malpractice may 
have been committed in the organisation where they work. These provisions and 
practices help to protect public funds, including European funds. 
In most Member States
82, it is primarily criminal law provisions which require civil 
servants to report infringements detected in the course of their duties. In addition 
there are also often
83 provisions in codes of conduct, circulars and manuals which set 
out rules and procedures for the application of this duty to inform. In eleven Member 
States
84, there is no obligation under criminal law to inform the authorities of 
irregularities detected or suspected; the obligation is imposed only by administrative 
law. 
The obligation to inform is often very general and relates to any suspicion of 
irregularity. In some circumstances it is limited to the most serious cases, such as 
                                                 
81  "Any official who, in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties, becomes aware 
of facts which gives rise to a presumption of the existence of possible illegal activity, including fraud or 
corruption, detrimental to the interests of the Communities, or of conduct relating to the discharge of 
professional duties which may constitute a serious failure to comply with the obligations of officials of 
the Communities shall without delay inform either his immediate superior or his Director-General or, if 
he considers it useful, the Secretary-General, or the persons in equivalent positions, or the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) direct." 
82  Belgium, the Czech Republic (where the Labour Code also contains relevant provisions), Estonia, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and 
Slovakia. 
83  Belgium, Estonia, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
84  Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.  
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criminal offences. One Member State
85 said that the obligation to inform was greater 
for offences affecting public finances and EU financial interests in particular. 
In all systems but two
86, when a staff member becomes aware of a fact that must be 
reported, the information must be passed first to his/her direct superior (or indirect 
superior where the circumstances justify it
87). It is this superior who passes the 
information on to the competent authorities where necessary. In some cases the staff 
member may also report the facts directly to an independent internal department, 
such as the internal audit department
88 or internal supervisory authority
89, without 
going via his/her superior. In other cases, as well informing his/her superior, the staff 
member may also inform an external authority such as the police
90, the public 
prosecutor's office
91, the fund-managing authorities
92 or an external supervisory 
authority
93. 
The information may be communicated in different ways: by letter, telephone, e-mail 
or fax. In one Member State, the informant must be identifiable when there is an 
obligation to report the offence
94. In two others, information can be provided 
anonymously
95. In five Member States information must be submitted in writing
96. 
Two Member States have Internet
97 notification systems, another one has a specific 
e-mail for informants
98 and five Member States have set up a free-phone system
99. 
In many cases, staff who discover a serious irregularity within the administration 
may fear reprisals from the people involved. To lessen this fear and encourage 
informing, various kinds of protection are offered: protection against dismissal
100, 
non-liability for financial damage caused by informing
101, non-disclosure of the 
identity of the informant
102, protection by the ombudsman on request
103. Standard 
employment law may also offer some protection: the requirement that unfavourable 
                                                 
85 Spain. 
86 Greece  and  Sweden. 
87  Latvia, the Netherlands and Slovenia. 
88  Belgium (Flemish Region), Ireland (for agriculture) and Malta. In Sweden, staff of the Swedish 
National Audit Office must report to the internal audit unit. 
89  Denmark, Lithuania ("irregularities inspector") Hungary ("person responsible for irregularities within 
the organisation") and Austria (an official responsible for combating corruption). 
90 Denmark,  Italy. 
91  France, Italy and Slovakia. In Greece, civil servants must report offences to the public prosecutor's 
office. 
92  Latvia, Malta and Poland. 
93  The Netherlands and Portugal (disciplinary authority). 
94 Belgium. 
95 Germany  and  Slovenia. 
96  Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. 
97  Lithuania (Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund). In Germany, Lower Saxony and Hanover already 
have such a system and a national system is due to be set up soon. 
98 Poland. 
99  The Czech Republic, Latvia, Austria, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
100 Spain  and  Ireland. 
101 Ireland. 
102  Ireland and Finland. 
103  Belgium, Flemish Community.  
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decisions against an employee be justified
104, the requirement that administrations 
protect their staff against any form of injustice or violence
105. 
When a judicial procedure is underway, the informant may ask for witness protection 
under the procedure provided for by the law
106, particularly where he/she or another 
person is in serious danger. One Member State
107 said that an informant has the right 
to be informed within a reasonable period of the action taken on his report and the 
right to appeal to an independent authority if he/she is not satisfied with the action 
taken. Some legal systems impose further conditions for protecting the informant in 
addition to his/her having acted reasonably and in good faith – for example that the 
irregularity gives rise to a real risk of harm
108. 
3.2.  The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
OLAF was established in 1999 to protect the financial interests of the European 
Union and the reputation of the European institutions. The office was restructured in 
2006 on the basis of experience acquired in the first years of its operation, in order to 
strengthen its effectiveness. 
In May 2006, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Regulation amending the 
Regulations on OLAF investigations
109 replacing a proposal dating from February 
2004
110. This new proposal takes account of the recommendations of the Court of 
Auditors and aims at improving the governance and the effectiveness of OLAF, and 
procedural laws. The proposal was transmitted to the Parliament and the Council for 
examination under the co-decision procedure. 
3.3.  Developing mutual assistance 
A proposal for a Regulation amending the Regulation on mutual assistance on 
agriculture and customs matters
111 adopted by the Commission in December 2006 
proposes extending the customs information system database
112 to enable it to be 
used in national analysis systems so that controls on goods can be targeted and action 
coordinated at Community level. The only way to prevent crime growing in these 
fields is to constantly improve the available instruments or innovate. The proposal 
aims to improve operational cooperation on customs matters and provide an interface 
between customs authorities, regional and international organisations (Interpol, the 
WCO
113 and Europol etc.) and EU bodies and agencies. It provides for the creation 
                                                 
104 Denmark  and  Latvia. 
105  France and Austria. 
106  Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia. 
107 The  Netherlands. 
108 Latvia  and  Austria. 
109  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No  1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti Fraud Office (OLAF) 
COM(2006) 244 final. 
110  COM(2004) 103 and 104. 
111  COM(2006)  866 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 on mutual assistance between the 
administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission 
to ensure the correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters, OJ L 82, 22.3.1997. 
112  CIS - Customs Information System. 
113  World Customs Organisation.  
EN  23     EN 
of a customs file identification database
114 and a European central directory of data 
from the principal service providers worldwide for the international carriage of goods 
and containers
115. It establishes a legal basis for the management of a permanent 
infrastructure for coordinating joint customs surveillance operations, making it 
possible for representatives or liaison officers of the Member States to be hosted at 
OLAF during the operational phase. 
An amended proposal adopted in September 2006
116 aims to establish a new, more 
complete and multidisciplinary mutual administrative assistance framework for the 
protection of the financial interests of the European Community against fraud and 
any other illegal activities. For this purpose, the proposed Regulation requires 
Member States and the Commission to cooperate, coordinate and assist each other 
and exchange information to allow swift investigations and appropriate action. The 
proposal does not give the Commission any investigative powers of its own, but 
offers Commission assistance to the Member States (service platform) for cases of 
cross-border fraud, like carousel frauds with VAT. The proposal sets out to optimise 
the use of information available, for example by using financial information from 
anti-money laundering for the fight against fraud detrimental to the Community's 
financial interests. 
3.4.  Combating cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting 
In 2006, six more Member States
117 signed up to the Agreement concluded in 2004 
between the Commission, ten Member States
118 and the cigarette manufacturer, 
Philip Morris International (PMI); by the end of December 2006, twenty-four 
Member States were parties to the Agreement
119. The United Kingdom is now the 
only Member State which has not signed up to the Agreement. The Agreement 
provides for an effective system to combat cigarette smuggling and counterfeiting. It 
improves the exchange of information between the parties on seizures of smuggled 
or counterfeited cigarette consignments (bearing Philip Morris trademarks) and day-
to-day communication between them on operations covered by the Agreement. 
Among the principal aspects of the Agreement are the “tracking and tracing” 
protocols on cooperation between OLAF and the Member States on one side and 
PMI on the other. This cooperation involves tracking and tracing cigarettes to 
determine where they left the supply chain and fell into the hands of smugglers. 
Under the agreement, approximately USD 1 billion will be paid over a period of 
twelve years to the European Communities and the ten Member States that signed the 
Agreement in July 2004. Between the signing of the agreement and the end of 2006 
PMI paid out approximately USD  425  million. In October 2006 the original ten 
signatory Member States and the Commission, acting for the EC, confirmed their 
agreement on the distribution of these payments. The amount paid into the 
                                                 
114  FIDE – Customs File Identification Database. 
115  EU Container Targeting System. 
116 COM(2006)  473. 
117  Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary and Sweden. 
118  Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Finland. 
119  With Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the Agreement in March 2007, the number is twenty-six.  
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Community budget is 9.7% of the amount received, the rest being transferred to the 
Member States’ budgets. 
3.5.  Protecting the euro 
The Commission continued to coordinate the efforts of the Member States to protect 
the euro against counterfeiting in close cooperation with Europol and the European 
Central Bank. 
OLAF also manages the Pericles action programme for exchanges, assistance and 
training intended to protect the euro against counterfeiting
120. This programme co-
finances trans-national and multidisciplinary projects. It is intended to raise 
awareness among the staff concerned with the Community dimension of the euro, to 
bring the structures and staff concerned closer together and to develop a climate of 
mutual trust, to achieve similar high standards of training for trainers and to expand 
general knowledge, particularly with regard to relevant Community and international 
law and instruments. In 2006 twelve projects were launched, including nine proposed 
by the competent authorities of the Member States and three by the 
Commission/OLAF. 
In view of its success, the programme was extended to the end of 2013
121. 
3.6.  Initiatives taken by certain Member States in 2006 
Several Member States stated that they had adopted new laws to combat VAT fraud 
in 2006. In Denmark, stricter rules are now applied for the activation of guarantees 
and liquidation of companies involved in carousel-type fraud. Italy adopted a law 
imposing more severe criminal penalties for VAT fraud. In Slovenia, a "missing 
trader" may now be penalised by cancellation of its VAT registration. A new 
Portuguese law introduces measures to combat VAT fraud in the waste sector. Some 
Member States have taken measures to reinforce joint liability for non-payment of 
VAT
122. 
The Czech Government adopted a resolution on the anti-corruption strategy for 
2006-11. 
Some Member States adopted bilateral agreements on mutual assistance in customs 
matters with other Member States or with third countries in 2006
123. 
                                                 
120 http://ec.europa/anti-fraud/programmes/pericles/2006/index_en.html. 
121  Council Decision 849/2006 of 20 November 2006 modifying and extending the Decision 2001/923/EC 
establishing an action programme for exchanges, assistance and training is intended to protect the euro 
against counterfeiting (Pericles programme). 
122  Belgium and Denmark with regard to the liability of company directors, and Spain regarding the joint 
liability of consortia. 
123  Belgium signed agreements with Belarus and Congo, Portugal with Spain, and Slovakia with Slovenia, 
Albania and Israel.  
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4.  RECOVERY 
4.1.  Agriculture 
4.1.1.  The work of the Task Force Recovery 
In 2002, the Commission announced the setting-up of a Task Force Recovery (TFR) 
to examine the considerable backlog of recovery cases concerning the EAGGF 
Guarantee Section. 
The Agriculture and Rural Development Directorate-General and OLAF's joint TFR 
was responsible for 463 cases involving more than €500 000 each and 3 227 cases 
involving less than €500  000 each, following an irregularity reported to the 
Commission prior to 1999. The situation with regard to TFR's work at 
31 December 2006 can be summarised as follows. 
(a) Cases involving more than €500 000 each.  
On 3 October 2006, a first formal Commission Decision
124 was taken concerning 
financial liability in 349 cases of non-recovery totalling approximately €895 million. 
This Decision cleared from the debtors' lists: 
–  41 cases involving €176  million, charged to the Community budget 
because the Member States had taken all necessary measures, which 
meant that the non-recovery could not be attributed to them; 
–  164 cases involving €317 million, charged to the relevant Member States 
as a result of negligence on their part in the recovery procedure; 
–  144 cases involving approximately €402  million, removed from the 
debtors' list as non-cases or double entries. 
Clearance has yet to take place for the 114 cases remaining. 
–  59 cases, involving €111.9 million, in which the Commission found that 
the Member States concerned had shown due diligence in the recovery 
procedure, which was still ongoing; 
–  55  cases totalling €128.6  million in which the clearance of accounts 
procedure is still ongoing but should be completed in 2007. 
In addition, on 13 October 2006, the Commission adopted a decision
125 concerning 
€6  653  487 for 50 cases concerning Belgium, Germany, Ireland, France, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. This sum was charged to the 
Community budget as the Member States had shown due diligence in their recovery 
efforts. 
                                                 
124  Commission Decision 2006/678/EC of 3 October 2006 (OJ L 278, 10.10.2006, p. 24). 
125 C(2006)  4801.  
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(b) Cases involving less than €500  000 each.  Regulation (EC) 1290/2005 
introduced an automatic clearance mechanism for irregular payments not recovered 
within four years of the primary administrative or judicial finding or within eight 
years where recovery action is taken in the national courts. In that case, 50% of the 
financial consequences of non-recovery are borne by the Member State in question 
and 50% by the Community budget. 
The new mechanism has been in operation since 16 October 2006 and covers all 
cases of non-recovery open at that date, including the 114 cases referred to above and 
cases reported by the Member States before 31 December 1998 involving less than 
€  500  000 each. Accordingly, all irregularities from before 2003 (1999 where 
recovery action is taken in the national courts) involving money not recovered by 
16 October 2006 were cleared in 2007 using the 50%-50% rule. The Commission 
applied the rule for the first time in the account-clearance decision adopted in 
April 2007
126. 
4.1.2.  Financial corrections 
In addition to the recovery activity described above, the Commission also excluded 
certain expenditure incurred by Member States’ approved paying agencies from 
financing under the EAGGF-Guarantee section, because they were not in conformity 
with Community rules. Following checks and bilateral meetings between the 
Commission and the competent authorities of thirteen Member States, the 
Commission excluded expenditure of some €575.5 million from European financing 
in three 2006 decisions
127. 
The Commission also excluded expenditure of more than €500 000 from Community 
financing with regard to the SAPARD agencies of two countries
128. 
4.2.  Structural Funds 
In the area of the Structural Funds, the recovery of unduly paid amounts due to 
irregularity or fraud is carried out by Member States. The recovery of those amounts 
at Commission level can be done by reduction or cancellation of the financial 
contribution with the possibility of a transfer of funds to other operations. 
The programmes co-financed by the Structural Funds are multi-annual and based on 
interim payments. Recovery of amounts unduly paid may take place before or after 
conclusion of the programme. For the 1994-99 programming period, the deadline for 
presentation of the request for final payment to the Commission was 31 March 2003. 
In that period, the Community cofinanced around 1 000 programmes worth around 
€159 billion in total
129. The Commission’s authorising and managing departments 
(DGs REGIO, EMPL, AGRI, FISH), assisted by the European Anti-Fraud Office, are 
responsible for administrative and financial follow-up once these programmes have 
                                                 
126  Commission Decision 2007/327/EC of 27 April 2007, OJ L 122, 11.5.2007. 
127  Decision 2006/334/EC, 2006/554/EC and 2006/932/EC, OJ L 124, 11.5.2006, OJ L 218, 9.8.2006 and 
OJ L 355, 15.12.2006. 
128  Commission Decisions C(2005)3702 and C(2006)2405, not published in the Official Journal. 
129  These are multiannual programs. This figure does not include projects directly financed under the 
Structural Funds and projects co-financed under the Cohesion Fund.  
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been concluded. This follow-up is based in particular on the reports of irregularities 
sent in by the Member States in accordance with Regulation No  1681/94
130 and 
recorded in the External Communications Registry database. 
In the 1994-99 programming period, the Member States communicated 11 573 cases 
of irregularities with a financial impact of approximately €1.452 billion
131 for the 
Community contribution. 
Of these cases, 5 488 have been closed definitively at Commission level and the 
amount of €600 million was taken into account during final payment. Member States 
informed the Commission that administrative and judicial procedures had been 
concluded at national level for a further 2 016 cases relating to the same period, with 
a financial impact of €173  million. The Commission departments have started 
reconciliation procedures with a view to closing these cases. 
Concerning the 2000-06 programming period, the Member States have so far 
communicated 8 733 cases of irregularities with a financial impact of approximately 
€1.156 billion for the Community contribution. 
Member States have informed the Commission that administrative and/or judicial 
procedures have been concluded at national level for 3  686 of these and that 
some €345 million has been recovered. 
In 2006, the financial correction figure was €502  million for the 1994-99 
programming period and €521  million for the 2000-06 period. The financial 
corrections are the result of audits by the Commission and the Court of Auditors and 
the closure procedure for programmes from the 1994-99 period. They consist of 
official financial correction decisions following the detection of an irregularity, 
decommitments on programme closure resulting in a reduction in Community 
financing because the Member State did not declare sufficient eligible expenditure, 
and reimbursement of amounts recovered following the completion of court cases 
still pending when the programmes in question were closed. The figures do not 
include financial corrections that did not result in recovery, such as corrections made 
when a Member State detected an irregularity or accepted the financial correction 
proposed by the Commission and the irregular amount was reallocated to another 
project. 
4.3.  Own resources 
The Member States must recover established amounts relating to irregularity cases 
registered in the OWNRES system. On 30 March 2007, the recovery rate for cases 
communicated in 2006 was 32% (approximately €113 million). 
For various reasons, it is possible that the amount initially established may not be 
recovered in full, in spite of the Member States' efforts, for example when the 
amount becomes irrecoverable because of the insolvency of the debtor, or when it is 
modified because of new information received or following judicial proceedings. 
                                                 
130 OJ  L178,  12.7.1994. 
131  Situation according to the data contained in the ECR database at 18 May 2007.  
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When non-recovery of an established debt is not attributable to a Member State, the 
Member State may request that the irrecoverable amount be written off. In 2006, the 
Commission refused Member States' write-off requests in 59 cases, worth 
approximately €4.6 million, because it deemed that non-recovery was attributable to 
the Member States. 
Moreover, certain Member States were held financially responsible for a total of 
some €33.4 million because they did not establish customs debts where they should 
have. 
4.4.  Recovery following an OLAF investigation 
Where an OLAF investigation finds that certain sums have probably been paid to a 
beneficiary against the rules or that sums that should have been collected have not 
been, the relevant authorities (generally the authorities in the Member States or third 
countries concerned) must recover the amounts in question. In 2006, almost 
€114 million was recovered following OLAF investigations. 
Table 4: Recovery following an OLAF investigation 
Sector  Recovery 2006 
Customs 0.1 
Agriculture 1.2 
Structural Funds  17.2 
Direct expenditure  93.1 
Internal investigations  2.2 
Total  113.8 
4.5.  National legislation on the recovery of EU funds 
The last annual report gave an overview of the Member States' recovery procedures. 
Analysis of the contributions showed that recovery by offsetting, generally 
understood to mean clearing a claim and a debt which cancel each other out, is 
possible in nearly all the Member States for public funds. Offsetting is a very 
effective way of recovering public funds, which is why the 2006 questionnaire set 
out to clarify some aspects of the mechanism. 
In principle, all legal systems provide for the offsetting of a debt and a claim which 
fall under the same Community fund
132. However, this does not apply where the debt 
                                                 
132  However, in some Member States (Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg, Hungary and Malta) 
offsetting is limited to the agricultural sector.  
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and the claim fall under different Community funds; in this case offsetting is only 
possible in half of the Member States
133. 
Within the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, offsetting a debt and a claim relating to 
different agricultural sectors is possible under nearly all the national legal systems
134. 
Those Member States which use offsetting for the Structural Funds and Cohesion 
Fund generally only apply it within the same programme. Offsetting is possible 
between different programmes in just ten Member States
135. It is possible between 
different programming periods in just ten Member States
136. In four Member States, 
offsetting is possible even where the recovery and the payment do not come under 
the same paying agency
137. 
In most Member States a Community debt and a national claim can be offset and 
vice versa
138. 
Some Member States have statistics on their recovery practices, which they 
communicated to the Commission in the context of this report. They show that some 
Member States use offsetting regularly. For example, over the last three years 
recovery by offsetting accounted for between 75% and 90% of all public funds 
recovered in the agricultural sector in Ireland, between 73% and 94% for livestock 
premiums in France, approximately 90% in the agricultural sector in Austria, more 
than 50% in the agricultural sector and between 21% and 93% for the European 
Social Fund in Sweden
139. These figures include national funds but a considerable 
proportion is accounted for by European funds recovered by offsetting. 
While offsetting is used extensively in some Member States to recover Community 
funds, it is used much less in other Member States, even though it would be legally 
possible under certain conditions. The Commission can only encourage the use of 
this very effective instrument for recovering Community funds wherever possible. 
To increase the use of offsetting, the authorities responsible for recovery could be 
given access to databases, such as those belonging to other paying agencies or central 
databases, as is already the case in some Member States
140. 
                                                 
133  Belgium (Flemish Government), Denmark, Germany, Ireland (between the two sections of the EAGGF, 
but not used in practice), Spain, France (between the two sections of the EAGGF), Italy, the 
Netherlands, Poland (where the funds are managed by the same body), Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden. 
134  Exceptions: Estonia, Malta and Slovenia. In Austria, offsetting is possible, but only within the same 
paying agency. 
135  Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United 
Kingdom. 
136  Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain , Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland and the United 
Kingdom.  
137  Belgium (Flemish Region), Denmark, Germany and Italy. 
138  It is not possible in Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden or the 
United Kingdom. In some Member States, this type of offsetting is confined to the agricultural sector. 
In Slovenia and Slovakia it is possible to offset a debt to the Community budget with a national claim, 
but not the other way round. 
139  For all the statistics provided by the Member States, see SEC(2007) 930. 
140  Belgium (Walloon Region), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, France, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 